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Unsustainable Societies: The Failure of Familialism 
in East Asia’s Compressed Modernity 
Emiko Ochiai  
Abstract: »Gesellschaften ohne Nachhaltigkeit: Das Versagen des Familialis-
mus in der komprimierten Moderne Ostasiens«. Fertility in some East Asian 
societies has declined to a new global low level, which can be called “ultra-low 
fertility.” The first question of this article is whether East Asia is going through 
a second demographic transition just like Europe. The second question is 
whether individualism is the cause of the change. The answer to the first ques-
tion is both yes and no, because the demographic changes currently underway 
in East Asia have similarities to those in Europe and North America, but there 
are considerable differences in essence. Unlike Europe, where cohabitation is 
replacing marriage, marriage as an institution of duty and responsibility rather 
than intimacy is still intact in East Asia. Because of that, risk-aversive indi-
vidualization occurred to avoid the burden of a family. It is not individualism 
but familialism that is causing the current demographic and family changes in 
East Asia. Different degrees of compression of modernity created the varieties 
of familialism: familialist reform in Japan and “liberal familialism” in other 
societies. We may conclude that both types of familialism have failed in con-
structing a sustainable social system. 
Keywords: lowest-low fertility, East Asia, compressed modernity, familialism, 
second demographic transition. 
 
In today’s world, East Asia is the region most associated with very low fertil-
ity. The latest total fertility rates (TFR) for Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Singa-
pore and Japan are 1.03 (2009), 1.06 (2008), 1.19 (2008), 1.28 (2008), 1.37 
(2008) respectively. In the 1990s, Southern and German-speaking European 
countries recorded fertility levels below 1.3, which was described as the “low-
est-low fertility” (Kohler et al. 2002), but contemporary Asia has broken 
through that level. In the second demographic transition theory, lowered fertil-
ity is hypothesized as being caused by individualism (Lesthaeghe 1991; van de 
Kaa 1987). The first question of this article is whether we can consider that 
East Asia is going through a second demographic transition, just like Europe. 
The second question is whether individualism is also the cause for the low 
fertility in East Asia. 
In order to answer these questions, this paper uses two strategies. The first is 
to embed fertility in the wider social context. By focusing on changes in mar-
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riage we can clearly see the differences between East Asia and Europe. The 
other strategy is the comparison method, not only between regions, i.e., be-
tween East Asia and Europe, but also within regions. The key concept of this 
paper is “compressed modernity” (Chang 1999), referring to the way moderni-
zation has happened in such a brief period. This article will show how the 
increased complexity of the modernization process due to chronological com-
pression in East Asian modernity has led each society to respond that with its 
own policy directions, which have had crucial effects on materially construct-
ing the current situation in East Asia. 
1. Ultra-low and Lowest-low Fertility in East Asia 
1.1 Diversity Within East Asia 
First, let us take a demographic view at the current state of East Asian societies. 
The geographical tag “East Asia” has, in recent years, been used in two ways. 
The first is the traditional way of referring to the countries of China, Korea, 
Japan, and Taiwan, in a more restricted sense of the term. The second is a more 
encompassing use that takes in both East Asia in the narrow sense and also 
Southeast Asia. In the context of proposing the establishment of an East Asian 
community, the wider sense is the one most often used, although this region, 
unlike Europe where the EU has been created, has never historically been a 
politically or culturally unified whole. Language, religion, kinship organiza-
tions, and many other aspects demonstrate that East Asia, in the wider sense, is 
an extremely diverse region. 
The diversity of East Asia is also shown in its current fertility levels. We see 
a range in the TFR from almost 1.0 to greater than 4.0. When we look at East 
Asia in terms of fertility, we can divide it into four blocks (Table 1). The first 
group contains Japan, the earliest country in this region to undergo rapid eco-
nomic growth in the 1960s, and the “four tigers” (Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, known as NIES) which underwent economic growth in the 1980s 
as the so-called “Asian Miracle,” which make up the lowest-low fertility socie-
ties. The second group consists of Thailand and China which have fertility 
levels between 1.5 and 2.0. The third group is the bulk of Southeast Asian 
nations, as well as Mongolia and North Korea, which are maintaining relatively 
high fertility rates of between 2.0 and 3.0. The fourth group is the countries of 
Laos and Cambodia, which have not yet completed their first fertility transi-
tion. 
When examined from a global perspective, we can split Group 1 up further 
into two sub-groups. The first includes Singapore and Japan, nations with ap-
proximately the same lowest-low fertility as post-communist CEE countries, 
Southern Europe and German-speaking countries. The other consists of Tai-
wan, Hong Kong and Korea, which have levels lower than anywhere else in the 
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world. This second sub-group can be termed “ultra-low fertility” societies 
(Straughan et al. 2008). This article mainly deals with the ultra-low and lowest-
low fertility societies, but it will discuss other East Asian societies as needed.  
1.2 The Historical Development of Low Fertility 
We shall now take a closer look at the five ultra-low and lowest-low fertility 
societies in East Asia. Figure 1 shows the TFRs from 1970 in these societies 
and demonstrates that all of them except Japan had TFRs above 3.0 in 1970. 
Governments started family planning programs as a national policy immedi-
ately following WW2 in Japan and Singapore (Suga 2010, 140), and in the 
1960s in Korea and Taiwan (Yamaji 2010, 43), spurring the fertility transition. 
Replacement level fertility was reached in Japan in 1956, in Singapore in 1975, 
and in Korea and Taiwan in 1984 (Suzuki 2010, 20). Hong Kong reached re-
placement level in 1980. 
After reaching replacement level, Japan’s fertility remained steady for about 
twenty years, and then in 1974 started dropping below replacement level. In 
other words, it immediately followed the second fertility decline that began in 
Europe around 1970. In contrast to this, there was no period in the other four 
societies where fertility remained steady around the replacement level. When 
we compare fertility declines in Europe and East Asia, this is the key difference 
to note. In Singapore, birth control policies were followed even after replace-
ment level was reached, and in the 1970s a new system of fertility control was 
even brought in, whereby anyone who wished was able to have an abortion or 
undergo sterilization (Suga 2010, 141). Korea and Taiwan were also slow in 
making policy changes, and by the 1980s fertility levels in the four societies 
temporarily dropped below that of Japan. 
By the 1990s, while Japan’s fertility continued to drop, that of Singapore, 
Korea, and Taiwan steadied temporarily, holding at between 1.6 and 1.8. In 
Singapore, the quality of the populace started to be of governmental concern 
from 1984, with well-educated women from the upper income brackets being 
encouraged to give birth, and conversely with poorly-educated women from 
lower income brackets being encouraged to undergo sterilization. In 1986, 
existing population control policies started to be revised, and Singapore’s Fam-
ily Planning and Population Board was closed down. In 1987, the old “Two-
child families for Singapore” slogan was replaced with “Have three or more if 
you can afford it” (Suga 2010, 142). In stark contrast to Japan, where there was 
an allergy to the pronatalist ideas of the “Give Birth and Procreate” policy of 
WW2, Singapore changed quite quickly to a birth promotion policy. On the 
other hand, during this time Korea and Taiwan had few fears regarding the 
decline of fertility, and “South Korean demographers used to interpret Japan’s 
very low fertility as a social symptom of advanced industrial capitalism that 
was shared by most Western countries” (Chang 2010, 35). 
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A new aspect started after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-98, and be-
came clearer once the 21st century started. The TFRs for Taiwan, Singapore, 
and Korea dropped sharply, and while they recovered briefly in 2000, started 
plummeting again in 2001. In that year, Korea fell below the 1.3 level, and in 
2003 Japan, Korea, and Singapore followed suit.1 Following that, fertility in 
Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore dropped below Japan, and while Japan and 
Singapore showed either a slight improvement or held steady, Korea and Tai-
wan continued dropping along with Hong Kong, going below 1.1 and recording 
a new global low level of fertility. The lowest levels each society reached were 
1.05 in Korea in 2008, 1.03 in Taiwan in 2009, 0.98 in Hong Kong in 2007. 
This group, termed “ultra-low fertility societies,” started showing its unique 
trends from this period. Explanations for this trend are only just beginning. 
Suzuki Toru, for example, has contrasted the strong Confucian family tradi-
tions of Korea and Taiwan and other nations with the feudal family traditions 
of Southern Europe and Japan, trying to find a causal factor in traditional fam-
ily structures (Suzuki 2010). I propose that we should pay more attention to the 
economic aspects, because the economic crisis in 1997-98 seems to have 
played a critical role in altering the trends. 
1.3 Compressed Modernity and Demographic Transitions 
Earlier, I noted how we need to focus on the fact that, in the process of declin-
ing fertility, Asian societies outside Japan never had a period where fertility 
stayed at the replacement level, an argument I would like to develop further 
now. When we take another look at long-term trends in declining fertility in 
different regions of the globe from a macro perspective, we can gain a theoreti-
cal idea for considering social change in East Asia.  
Figure 2 shows the long-term trends in TFR for a number of East Asian 
countries, including Japan, as well as those of Europe and the U.S. The first 
thing we should notice, at least in Europe, is that there were two declines, one 
as part of the first demographic transition and the other as part of the second. 
An interesting fact is that, with very few exceptions, societies within one re-
gion – i.e. Europe or Asia – experienced their fertility declines almost simulta-
neously. In those two regions – with the exceptions of France in Europe and 
Japan in Asia – there is a gap of about half a century in the timings of first 
fertility declines. The first fertility decline occurred in most European societies 
between the 1870-80s and 1920-30s, and in most East Asian societies in the 
1970s-80s. Japan experienced it in the 1950s, exactly halfway between the time 
of most European countries and that of most East Asian countries. In terms of 
                                                             
1  Hong Kong has been at a level below 1.3 since the 1990s, but since it was handed over to 
China in 1997, the political situation at the time means that it will not be discussed in an 
equal sense. 
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timing, Japan does not fall into either the European group or the Asian group. 
For the same given period, it shares no social situation or policy issues with the 
societies of either region. I believe that this is connected with the difficulties of 
political decision-making and diplomatic isolation that Japanese society con-
stantly experienced. 
Next, when did the second fertility decline take place? In Europe and the 
U.S., it started at the end of the 1960s, and from the mid-1970s in Japan. Thus 
while there was a quarter-century gap between Japan and most countries in 
Europe for the first fertility decline, for the second fertility decline, the gap was 
only several years. Latecomers thus had their modernity not only delayed but 
“compressed,” as the Korean sociologist Chang Kyung-Sup2 has noted (Chang 
1999). 
When, then, did the second fertility decline take place in Asian countries 
other than Japan? Examining Figure 2 with this question in mind can lead to 
confusion. In Asian countries, the fertility decline is continuing; we cannot see 
any boundary between the first and second fertility declines as we could for 
Europe, the U.S., or Japan. We need to operationally define a decline below 
replacement levels as a second fertility decline, which means that in Singapore 
the second fertility decline started in the mid-1970s, only a few years after 
Japan. Meanwhile, the second declines in South Korea, Thailand, and China 
started, respectively at the beginning of the 1980s, in the second half of the 
1980s, and in the 1990s. 
If we think of the period between these two fertility declines – when fertility 
was stable and at around the replacement level – as the “golden age” of moder-
nity, then the length of this period was about 50 years in Europe and America, 
20 years in Japan, and almost nonexistent in the rest of East Asia. As the Asian 
societies other than Japan have not experienced a stable modernity, they have 
plunged headlong and directly into late or second modernity3. 
From the demographic point of view, we can see very clearly the compres-
sion of modernity that Chang Kyung-Sup pointed out. Areas in Asia outside 
Japan have gone through this “compressed modernity,” while Japan having a 
“semi-compressed modernity,” and this provides an explanation for the experi-
ences these regions would later undergo. Chang Kyung-Sup defined this con-
cept as “Compressed modernity is a social situation in which economic, politi-
cal, social and/or cultural changes occur in an extremely condensed manner 
                                                             
2  East Asian names are given in the East Asian order of surname first. 
3  The term “second modernity” was coined by Ulrich Beck to explain the fact that a modern 
society with distinctly different attributes to the previous modern society had arisen in 
Europe in the 1970s. The previous, classical modernity he termed “first modernity.” Beck 
did not define these two maternities in relation to the two demographic transitions, but I 
believe they should be, so at times I shall refer to the society created by the first demo-
graphic transition as the “first modernity” and the society created by the second demo-
graphic transition as the “second modernity”(Ochiai 2010a). 
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with respect to both time and space, and in which the dynamic coexistence of 
mutually disparate historical and social elements leads to the construction and 
reconstruction of a highly complex and fluid social system” (Chang 2010, 24). 
2. Paradox of Marriage in East Asia  
2.1 Divorce, Late Marriage, Celibacy 
In the second demographic transition in Europe, it was not just fertility, but 
marriage-related indicators that showed major changes. These indicators in-
cluded an increase in divorce rates, a decrease in marriage rates, an increase in 
age at first marriage, an increase in the proportion never married, an increase in 
cohabitation rate, and an increase in births out of wedlock. In East Asia, which 
has plummeted to extreme levels of fertility never seen historically, changes 
related to marriage superficially appear to resemble Europe, but differ in es-
sence.  
Divorce rates in East Asia are also increasing notably (Figure 3). After the 
late 1960s, when the divorce rate in Europe started rising, an increasing trend 
was also seen in Japan, which by the 1980s spiked at a crude divorce rate of 
1.50, and in 2002 recorded an all-time high of 2.30. This is the same level as 
European countries like the UK, Germany, Sweden, and France shown in Table 
3. In Taiwan and Korea, divorce rates started rising from the 1980s. By the 
start of the 1990s they were closing in on Japan, passing it during the Asian 
Financial Crisis, with Korea’s 2003 record level of 3.50 almost the same as the 
U.S.’s 3.60. 
However, in a comparison of East Asian and European divorces, we must 
not overlook the fact that unlike Europe, where marriage has become an option 
in life and so the marriage rate itself is decreasing, in East Asia the marriage 
rate is not that much lower. So when we look at the ratio of marriage and di-
vorce (Table 3), North and South American and European nations dominate, 
with East Asia’s highest figures remaining at 0.45 for Taiwan, 0.39 for Hong 
Kong and 0.36 for Korea. At the lower end of the spectrum we can see Viet-
nam and Mongolia, which are lower than Italy or Iran. Marriage in East Asia is 
changing, but at the moment marriage is still relatively common, and once a 
couple is married, they are less likely to divorce than in Northwest Europe or 
North and South America.  
The increases in age at first marriage and in proportion never married are 
also clear in East Asia. Figure 4 shows the changes in age at first marriage in 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Japan was the first to show 
an increase, but Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea show steep curves, and for 
men, outpaced Japan in the 1990s, while for women, showed almost no differ-
ence by the 2000s. The age at first marriage in these societies at the 2005-06 
 225 
point was 30-31 for men and about 27-28 for women, close to Western Euro-
pean levels. 
The proportion never married cannot be calculated until the relevant cohorts 
are 50 years old, so Figure 5 only shows Japan, which was the first to show 
changes. Once the rise in the 1970s in women who never married (due to eligi-
ble men having died during the war) ended, the proportions of both men and 
women who never married at all increased, leading to a society in which one in 
six men and one in thirteen women would never experience marriage in their 
lifetime. These numbers are lower than Sweden for both sexes, but are higher 
than other European societies. When we look at the proportions of women aged 
35-39 who are unmarried in Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and Taiwan for com-
parison, the levels are 19%, 16%, 15% and 8% respectively, showing that there 
is a considerable gap from the “early marriage and universal marriage that 
marked the marriage patterns of mid-20th century Asia” (Suzuki 2010, 21). 
2.2 Cohabitation and Births Out of Wedlock 
There is another point we need to focus on here. In Europe, these phenomena – 
the increase in age at marriage and proportion never married – occur as a set 
with the increase in cohabitation and births out of wedlock. In other words, 
even if Europeans may marry later, they still have sexual liaisons and cohabit, 
causing a “transformation of intimacy” (Giddens 1992). 
In contrast to this, in Asia there is no such clear increase in either cohabita-
tion or births out of wedlock, and this aspect has been termed the greatest dif-
ference from the European second demographic transition. According to a 
survey of unmarried people in Japan, the ratio of those aged between 18 to 50 
who responded that “there is no one of the opposite sex I am involved with” 
was 52.2% for men and 44.7% for women, and there is even a slight increase 
trend since the 1990s (NIPSSR 2005). Japan’s increase in age at marriage and 
proportion never married does not seem to be from “transformation of inti-
macy” but, rather, represents a “lack of intimacy.” 
Indeed, in just the past few years there have been reports that the number of 
people cohabiting is increasing. A Cabinet Office survey carried out at the start 
of 2009 (Cabinet Office 2009) compared the ratio of those who had experience 
cohabiting in each age group from the three countries of Japan, Korea, and 
Singapore. Those results are shown in Table 2 with the results from a 2005 
survey (Cabinet Office 2005) covering the same topic in the U.S., France, and 
Sweden for comparison (Kojima 2010a, Kojima 2010b). In contrast to Europe 
and North America, especially Sweden, where cohabitation is the majority, it 
remains a minority in East Asia, but is spreading, starting from Japan, then 
Singapore, then Korea. As there are large differences in the ratios of between 
men and women who have experienced cohabitation in Korea, it has been 
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suggested that female respondents are concealing their experience (Kojima 
2010a). 
Despite this, however, births out of wedlock are still extremely rare in East 
Asia. The ratio of births out of wedlock in 2005 was 2.0% in Japan, 1.5% in 
Korea, 4.0% in Taiwan, and 1.3% in Singapore (Suzuki 2010). In Europe, 
births out of wedlock count for more than half of all births in Northwestern 
Europe, and it rapidly increased even in Southern Europe (20.7% for Italy, 
28.4% for Spain and 31.6% for Portugal), a great contrast with East Asia (Su-
zuki 2010). Instead, what we find is an increasing number of so-called “shot-
gun marriages,” or to be more faithful to the Japanese expression, “oops mar-
riages”4. In Japan, the number of marriages due to pregnancy increased from 
the second half of the 1990s, and the proportion of cases in which the birth of 
the first child was less than nine months after the wedding was 10.6% in 1980, 
but had increased to 20.9% in 1999, 25.6% in 2005 and 25.3% in 2009 
(MHLW 2010). The gap between the frequency of premarital sex and the con-
trasting conservative standards has presumably been responsible for this in-
crease in “oops marriages”. 
Cohabiting is possible, but must be concealed; pregnancy before marriage is 
possible, but birth out of wedlock must be avoided: there is still a very strong 
wall between marriage and other intimate relationships in East Asia. Unlike 
Europe, where cohabitation is replacing marriage and the institution of mar-
riage has weakened, in East Asia the institution of marriage, while shaky, is 
nevertheless solid. We can see a sign of compressed modernity here.  
2.3 International Marriages and High Sex Ratio at Birth 
When we talk about recent demographic changes in East Asia, we cannot ig-
nore international and cross-border marriages.5 Kojima Hiroshi includes these 
phenomena in the elements that make up the “East-Asian style second demo-
graphic transition” (Kojima 2010b). The increase in international marriages is 
once again led by Japan ahead of the other East Asian societies, starting back in 
the 1980s. In order to solve the problem of lack of eligible women for rural 
men to marry, a number of local authorities started government-led match-
making projects, encouraging marriage with women from Asian countries 
including the Philippines, Sri Lanka, etc. In other words, rather than natural 
love-based marriages, this growth in international marriage was driven by an 
extension of introduced marriages, the traditional marriage method. In short 
order, marriage brokers jumped on the international marriage promotion band-
                                                             
4  This type of marriage is called “dekichatta kon” in Japanese, which can be translated 
loosely as “Oops, we’ve done it! marriage”. It is important to note that these are not “forced 
marriages” in the sense of “shotgun marriages”. 
5  Regarding marriage migration in East Asian, see Palriwala and Uberoi (2008). 
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wagon. In the 2000s, international marriage moved to showing increase in 
urban areas and industrial regions (Liew, Ochiai and Ishikawa 2010).6  
Korea and Taiwan starting showing increased numbers of international mar-
riages from the 1990s, a little later than Japan, but they rapidly increased in 
number, soon rising to far overtake Japan. The proportions of international or 
cross-border marriages7 are 5.1% in Japan (2008), 11.0% in Korea (2008) and 
12.2% in Taiwan (2008) (NIPSSR 2010, Yamaji 2010, Ito 2010). While they 
declined later, in 2003 almost one marriage in three in Taiwan was a cross-
border marriage.8 
In Korea and Taiwan too the factor behind this was the lack of eligible 
women in rural areas and for lower-income men, but another factor, one not 
found in Japan, was the high sex ratio at birth. A high sex ratio has been preva-
lent in East Asia (in the narrow sense of the term) and South Asia for the past 
30 years, since the start of the first fertility decline, with the exception of Japan 
which does not have patrilineal kinship groups and strong son preference. Ko-
jima considers a high sex ratio to be another formative factor in the East Asian-
style second demographic transition (Kojima 2010b). The sex ratio at birth in 
1990 was 117 in Korea and 110 in Taiwan (Suzuki 2010). Ironically, the late 
start of the fertility decline enabled the people of these societies to use the new 
technologies of checking sex and sex-selective abortions. This is a typical 
example of compressed modernity. 
As the reason they chose international marriages, the husbands of foreign 
wives usually mention the need to have a son to inherit the family name, the 
need for people to care for elderly parents, and to ensure a labor supply for the 
farms (Ochiai 2007). It means that the increase in international marriage and 
cross-border marriage in East Asia occurs to maintain the traditional family. 
This too can be seen as a sign of compressed modernity. 
2.4 East Asian Marriage and Risk-Aversive Individualization 
Divorce, the age at marriage, and the proportion of celibacy are all rising but 
the institution of marriage is intact. International and cross-border marriages 
flourish but for very traditional purposes. When we examine these related is-
sues this way, it appears that “marriage” in East Asia may in fact have a differ-
ent meaning to that in Europe. 
We can see a striking character of the East Asian marriage in the relation-
ship between sex and marriage. According to a MHLW research group which 
carried out surveys every two years of the attitudes and behaviors related to sex 
                                                             
6  With the rise in the resident foreigner population, it appears to be increasing without de-
pending on the government or businesses (Liew, Ochiai and Ishikawa 2010). 
7  The term “cross-border marriage” is used in Taiwan to include marriages with mainland 
Chinese. 
8  28.0% of brides in 2003 were non-Taiwanese. 
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of men and women aged 16-49, in 2010 40.8% of married people had not have 
sex for the past month, a continual increase from the 31.9% recorded in 2004 
(Mainichi Newspaper 2011). This phenomenon has been termed “sexless cou-
ples” by the media. Sexlessness is also becoming an issue in Singapore as well, 
and novels are also written about the theme (Fujii 2010). If sex is at the center 
of intimacy, we can see that marriage in East Asia is not for the sake of inti-
macy itself, but is maintained for other reasons. 
Table 4 shows selected results from the 2006 EASS (East Asian Social Sur-
vey) conducted in Japan, Korea, China and Taiwan focusing on the issue of the 
family (Iwai and Yasuda 2009). The first five questions, such as “One must put 
familial well-being and interest before one’s own,” ask about the balance be-
tween individualism and familialism. In Korea, China, and Taiwan, 7 or 8 out 
of 10 respondents agreed with the above question, showing strong familialistic 
trends. Even in Japan, the lowest, more than half agreed. Agreement with the 
idea that “Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can’t seem to 
work out their marriage” was not low in the three societies other than Japan, 
but in Korea and China, agreement with “People who want to divorce must 
wait until their children are grown up” was enough high to prevent people 
following individualistic decisions. Inter-generational duties are not just from 
the parents to the children, but also “Children must make efforts to do some-
thing that would bring honor to their parents.” Marriage in East Asia is more 
about duty and responsibility than individual desire. 
There were many disagreements with the statements, “It is not necessary to 
have children in marriage” and “It is all right for a couple to live together with-
out intending to get married”. The total of “Strongly disagree,” “Fairly dis-
agree,” and “Somewhat disagree” was highest for both in Korea, with 77% and 
66%. Korea was also top in agreeing with “People who want to divorce must 
wait until their children are grown up”. The huge gap between these strong 
normative ideas and the reality of ultra-low fertility and high divorce rates 
shows the depth of the inconsistency within Korean society. 
Chang Kyung-Sup has explained this inconsistency under the concept of 
“risk-aversive individualization”. He notes that “South Koreans … have led 
highly family-centered social and personal lives under what may be called 
familist compressed modernity” (Chang 2010a, 24, Chang 2010b). This is as 
the family is the only social resource that can support individuals exposed to 
capitalist industrialization, urbanization, proletarianization, extreme tendencies 
in educational pursuit, and privatized welfare protection in rapid moderniza-
tion. However, “the institutional weakening of families induced family rela-
tions to turn from social resources into risks”. You might be obliged to help 
your family members and relatives who have become fallen behind in this 
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competitive world, rather than receiving support from them.9 So, “Risk-
aversive individualization is defined as a social tendency of individuals trying 
to minimize the family-associated risks of modern life by extending or return-
ing to individualized states of life” (Chang 2010a, 25). This is what actually 
happened after the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis in ultra-low fertility socie-
ties, People decided to postpone marriage or children or divorce to avoid the 
risk these might create for them. Kojima’s analysis of causes for cohabitation 
in Japan, Korea, and Singapore is suggestive (Kojima 2010a). He demonstrates 
that a common factor to all three societies is a lower educational background. 
The poor economy in Japan from 1992 to 2001 led to an increase in the number 
of people entering the workforce after high school who were cohabiting. In 
Korea, there was a large number of men with moderate education assumed to 
have been affected by the IMF Crisis (what the Asian Financial Crisis is known 
as in Korea) and in cohabitation relationships. In other words, cohabitation, 
which has started increasing in East Asia, is promoted by the “social exclusion” 
of people with lower education and unstable employment, rather than by indi-
vidualistic choices to free themselves from the institution of marriage.10 
Chang’s key point is that these tendencies are “not necessarily symptoms of 
individualization, because they seem to reflect the ever intensifying signifi-
cance of family relations and values in South Korean life” (Chang 2010a, 24). 
Chang also notes that these trends are not restricted to Korea, but are shared by 
Japan and Taiwan, summing the situation up as: “The apparent convergence of 
capitalist East Asia in individualization without individualism is a historical 
outcome of the condensed modernization and second modernization of the 
latecomers” (Chang 2010a, 35). 
3. Varieties of Familialism and their Failure 
3.1 Causes of Familialism 
Demographic and family changes currently underway in East Asia have similar 
phenomena-based aspects to the second demographic transition of Europe and 
North America, but in Europe while the institution of marriage is shaky and 
individualism has arisen, in East Asia in contrast the institution of marriage and 
familialism remain, showing superficially the same phenomenon. The extreme 
decline in fertility and the increase in divorces and in age at first marriage can 
be interpreted as desires to avoid the burden of a family, or to flee from them, 
                                                             
9  The Japanese sociologist Yamada Masahiro also presented the idea of seeing the family as a 
source of risk (Yamada 2001). 
10  However, Kojima also found a new tendency for highly-educated women in Japan to co-
habit after 2000, which might be interpreted as the birth of a new lifestyle (Kojima 2010a). 
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since the importance of the institution of family in terms of duty and responsi-
bility remains unchanged. 
So what causes familialism to be prevalent in East Asia? The first thing that 
comes to mind is a cultural explanation rooted in the region’s traditional cul-
ture, but, as noted above, there is no single shared culture common to all of the 
East Asian region. For example, the region from Southeast Asia to Japan has 
traditionally had high divorce rates and remarriage rates because there were no 
stigma attached (Reid 1993). Also, it was not uncommon to have children out 
of wedlock, and there was little discrimination towards illegitimate children 
(Ochiai and Nakajima 2010, Ochiai 2011). In this region, divorce and illegiti-
macy rates declined as part of the modernization process (Ochiai 2010, 8-9). 
On the other hand, the Northeastern area from North China to Korea, with its 
strong Confucian heritage, generally frowns on divorce and remarriage, not to 
mention children out-of-wedlock. Sechiyama contrasted the northern part and 
the southern part of East Asia in terms of gender relation: patriarchy with gen-
der segregation of social space in the northern area and more gender equality 
with women’s high contribution to rice production in the southern area. A 
simple cultural explanation cannot be applied (Sechiyama 1996).11 
According to Esping-Andersen, “familialism” is the idea that the family 
should have the greatest welfare responsibility towards its members, both in 
income distribution and care provision. He holds that, in its early stages, the 
modern welfare state was premised on familialism in virtually all nations. It 
was only from the 1970s onwards that the Scandinavian countries came to 
prioritize defamilialization. He insists that the consequence of familialistic 
social policy is two sub-optimal scenarios: low fertility or a high proportion of 
families in poverty (Esping-Andersen 2009, 81). As Esping-Andersen notes, 
Europe has progressed in three or four different directions through its policy 
choices from the 1970s. We should pay more attention to the policy decisions 
East Asian governments have made and are making under the conditions of 
compressed modernity. With the combined effects of compressed modernity 
and the policy decisions in it, East Asia has developed a stronger familialism 
than Europe at the same time as creating varieties of familialism (Ochiai 
2010b). 
3.2 Familialist Reform in Japan  
For Japan, we should understand the importance of the policy reform made in 
the 1980s. Prior to that, until the High Growth period of the 1960s, the Japa-
                                                             
11  However, there still is a room for the explanation based on the history of the area, if we 
relate the development of social welfare in Europe to Christianity. The lack of the process 
that the Christian church replaced the role of the family in taking care of their frail or dis-
advantaged members just as Jack Goody describes (Goody 1983) might be the reason of 
remaining and even strengthened familialism in Asia in history. 
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nese government was still following developmentalist policies. The policy 
focus was on economic growth under the strong leadership of MITI (Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry), and was, in a way, a continuation of the 
prewar system. In the realm of social policy, Japan started to develop social 
welfare, imitating Bismarkian social insurance schemes as early as in the first 
half of the twentieth century. After the Second World War, the Livelihood 
Protection Act was introduced and the universal pension system was estab-
lished for all save for non-working housewives. We may grant that Japan was 
ahead, in the Asian context, in the construction of social security system. How-
ever, the role of social security still remained peripheral in the 1960s, because 
growth was considered to be the best way to improve people’s well-being. We 
can call this system a sort of “workfare,” where high rates of employment are 
assumed to perform the same function as welfare. It was only when substantial 
economic growth had been achieved in the late 1960s and early ’70s that the 
government recognized the need to revise the existing welfare system to con-
struct a more appropriate welfare state. The year 1973 was named “Welfare 
Year 1,” which referred to it as the starting point for transforming Japan into a 
welfare state in the fuller sense.  
However, ironically, “Welfare Year 1” was hit by the Energy Crisis. The 
government became wary and set a new agenda called the “Japanese-style 
welfare society” that emphasized “traditional” Japanese virtues of “self-help 
and mutual support within the family and the community”. What the govern-
ment tried to promote was not actually a welfare “state” but a welfare “soci-
ety”. People might find an early example of welfare retrenchment and welfare 
pluralism in this idea but the important difference was the level prior to the 
change. Japan did not have much developed to retrench to. Rather, the size of 
social expenditure was increased in the 1970s and later. Under the conditions 
of compressed modernity, this development and retrenchment of welfare hap-
pened at the same time.  
There were also economic and demographic conditions that made it possi-
ble. Growth rates remained high even after the Energy Crisis, which affected 
Europe and North America even more seriously. Compared to Europe and 
North America, affluence lasted 20 years longer in Japan. Also, with an already 
low number of children and a still low number of elderly people, Japan was 
still enjoying a “demographic dividend” in the 1970s. In this period, the pro-
portion of working-age population in Japan was 69% (1970), higher than that 
in Europe (for example, 64% in Germany, 65% in Sweden) and other Asian 
countries (56% in Korea, 58% in Singapore) (see Figure 12 in Ochiai 2010a). 
Under these favorable conditions, growth rates even reached around 5 per cent 
per annum from the late 1980s to the early 1990s (IMF 2004), a period known 
as the “asset bubble”. A book entitled Japan As Number One by Ezra Vogel 
(Vogel 1979) became a best-seller in 1979, opening the way to the boom of 
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books about Japanese management and culture. The Japanese society was able 
to continue “workfare” for two more decades. 
In 1980s, the government made the “family” a policy issue to create the 
foundations of a “Japanese-style welfare society”. Flattered by the cultural 
explanations of Japan’s economic success, the government and their ideologues 
tried to create a unique policy direction, not imitating any policies in the West. 
They were also irritated by the changes in the family already becoming visible 
in the statistics, such as increasing divorce rates and age at marriage, and de-
creasing fertility. The Ohira Cabinet’s policy agenda on “Enrichment of Family 
Foundations” (1979) as well the so-called “Whitepaper on the Family” (a spe-
cial issue of the “Whitepaper on National Life”) were produced from this fear 
of a “family crisis” and a strong desire to protect the Japanese family, the core 
of national identity, from contamination by western culture. In other words, 
these policies were a reaction to the second demographic transition that started 
from Europe and North America. Laws known as the “protection of the house-
wife’s throne” were implemented in 1980s, including an increase in the legal 
inheritance amount for the wife (1980), pension reform that waived premiums 
for the wives of employees of large companies (1985), and the creation of a 
special tax deduction for those with dependent spouses (1986). 
The effect of this anachronistic familialist reform was enormous. Increase in 
the full-time employment of women since 1950’s ceased by the Energy Crisis 
and the only expansion in women’s employment from the latter half of 1970s 
to present was in part-time employment (Tanaka 1999, Ochiai 2010a, Figure 
10). This was because the wives of large company employees restricted their 
working hours to adjust their income within the amount to be recognized as 
“dependent” on their husband. This new gender division of labor – what Jane 
Lewis calls a “one-and-a-half earner model” (Lewis 2001) – was created in the 
recession, fixed by the law and remained entrenched for decades. In 1970, in 
contrast to expectations, the rate of female labor force participation was higher 
in Japan than in most European countries (Ochiai 2010a, 12). However, in the 
three decades that followed, Europe and North America each saw big jumps, 
while little change has been observed in Japan (Figure 6). Women’s participa-
tion rates by age still show an M-shape pattern in Japan. The gender role 
change occurred in most European and North American countries at the same 
time as the second demographic transition did not occur in Japan because of the 
familialist reforms of the 1980s. 
In 1990s Japan lost the economic and demographic conditions it had in 
1980s. When the bubble economy finally burst in 1991-92, the Japanese econ-
omy entered a long period of stagnation. Since then, Japan’s growth has been 
modest, with some fluctuations. The favorable demographic state did not last 
either. The proportion of elderly population skyrocketed in 1990s, reaching 
22.1% in 2008 (NIPSSR 2010), the highest rate in the world (Figure 7). In spite 
of these drastic changes in economic and demographic conditions, the familial-
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istic structure consolidated in the 1980s resisted change, resulting in the “lost 
decades”. The government introduced new policy measures from the late 
1990s, allegedly aiming for the socialization of care, but those policies were 
still heavily reliant on familialistic ideas. For example, the LTCI (Long-term 
Care Insurance), which was introduced in 2000, is designed to promote home-
based care, not institutional care. Family caregivers can hire “home helpers” 
for a number of hours a day with subsidies from this insurance, but they still 
suffer from responsibility for care for the rest of the day and from the economic 
burden of having to partially pay for this care (co-payment) (Ochiai et al. 
2011). 
3.3 Liberal Familialism in Other East Asian Societies 
Other East Asian societies had very different experiences than Japan. Moder-
nity was even more compressed in these other societies, forcing them to under-
take the paradoxical task of constructing a welfare state and at the same time, 
retrenching welfare (Miyamoto, Peng, and Uzuhashi 2003, 301). For example, 
Korean President Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2003) was faced with this despite the 
forced application of neo-liberalism and globalization after the IMF Crisis 
created a concept of “productive welfare” that would construct social welfare 
as a social investment, or in other words, the foundation of economic growth. 
Based on field research in six East Asian societies, our research team has 
proposed a framework for comparing the patterns of childcare and elderly care 
provision (Ochiai and Molony 2008, Ochiai 2009). One significant finding was 
the key role the market sector played in certain societies, especially for child-
care and elderly care in Singapore and for elderly care in Taiwan. This reflects 
the employment of foreign domestic workers and care workers in the home. 
The huge diversity within the Asian region means that we are seeing more and 
more transnational migration of domestic and care workers. Those families 
who hire care services from the market usually profess the familialistic idea 
that a family should take care of its elderly parents at home. Yet the reality is 
that it is migrant care workers who perform these care tasks. To put it another 
way, these families outsource their filial piety.12 We may call this approach 
“liberal familialism”. 
There are foreign domestic and care workers in Europe and North America 
as well. However, when we compare the proportions of foreign domestic and 
care workers in terms of the total foreign labor force, the figures are: Hong 
Kong 57.5%, Taiwan 26.6%, Singapore 17.8%, Spain 16.4%, Italy 10.4%, 
                                                             
12  According to Asato, foreign workers are “often referred to as an ‘intimate other’ to internal-
ize surrogate quasi-family member in order to maintain family function.” For the people 
who cannot afford hiring foreign domestic worker, an option is cross-border marriage. 
“Foreign household workers and marriage migrants are similar in that they both provide 
welfare within the family” (Asato 2010, 98). 
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France 7.2%, U.S.A. 2.0%, Germany 0.6% and UK 0.5% (Asato 2010). These 
figures demonstrate the extent to which East Asian societies depend on the 
domestic and care labor of foreign women. The only comparable cases in 
Europe are Spain and Italy, which are Southern European societies known to be 
familialistic. The employment of foreign domestic and care workers is com-
plementary to familialism. Asato Wako rather calls it “familialization policy” 
to “maintain family as a unit of welfare provision by incorporating foreign 
domestic workers.” He sees the intention of the government for “externaliza-
tion of welfare provision onto family,” “considering international economic 
competitiveness” (Asato 2010, 88). 
Compared with societies like Singapore or Taiwan, the complete lack of a 
solution that involves hiring foreign workers in Japan is striking. Japan’s im-
migration policy does not provide visas for unskilled foreign workers, so there 
are almost no foreign domestic or care workers in the country (Liew, Ochiai 
and Ishikawa 2010)13. Just as in the case of consolidation of the family, Japan 
sticks to its 1960s system and resists changes in numerous aspects in spite of 
the thorough transformation of the society. In its “semi-compressed modernity” 
Japan barely managed to build a structure resembling the first modernity. How-
ever, there was not enough time for it to mature and be reconstructed according 
to changing circumstances. In contrast, other East Asian societies had even less 
time in their much more “compressed modernity” to achieve stability, which 
functions as a positive factor to promote constant change. For example, the 
hiring of domestic workers was a normal habit in an earlier stage of modernity, 
Before losing their collective memory of hiring domestic help, other East Asian 
societies started accepting domestic workers with foreign nationalities, while 
the carefully-constructed privacy works as an obstacle in Japan’s case. 
Asian familialism is diverse in reality. However, even in the case of liberal 
familialism where the family receives care services from the market, the re-
sponsibility to finance the cost of care is usually borne by the family.14 This is 
why liberal familialism is still called familialism, and why fertility in these 
societies is also low. The economic burden is particularly heavy for people of 
economically disadvantaged statuses. The impact of the economic crisis in and 
after 1997-8 was severe, because in liberal familialism societies, it is people 
with lower economic status who are more vulnerable to economic stress. 
                                                             
13  Japan has recently begun accepting care workers as candidates to become nurses based on 
agreements with Indonesia and the Philippines, but their numbers are still few and the pro-
gram has a lot of problems (Asato 2009). 
14  The regulated market created by Japan’s LTCI has the same structure (Ochiai et al. 2011). 
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4. Conclusion 
The answer to the first question whether East Asia is going through a second 
demographic transition is both yes and no, because, at first glance, the demo-
graphic changes currently underway in East Asia have similarities to those in 
Europe and North America, but there are considerable differences in essence. 
Fertility in Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong has declined to a new global low 
level, which can be called “ultra-low fertility”. Divorce, the age at marriage, 
and the proportion never married are increasing but the rise in cohabitation is 
slow and births out of wedlock are avoided. Increasing international marriages 
and the high sex ratio at birth are special elements of the East-Asian style sec-
ond demographic transition. Marriage as an institution of duty and responsibil-
ity rather than intimacy is still intact in East Asia. Because of that, when family 
relationships changed from being social resources to being risks during the 
economic crisis, risk-aversive individualization occurred to avoid the burden of 
a family. The answer to the second question, therefore, is that it was not indi-
vidualism but familialism that is causing the current demographic and family 
changes in East Asia. 
The cause of the prevalence of familialism in East Asia is not primarily cul-
tural factors, but compressed modernity. In the semi-compressed modernity in 
Japan, the anachronistic familialist reform of the 1980s consolidated the family 
and gender structure of the 1960s, which then resisted the economic and demo-
graphic changes in the 1990s, resulting in the “lost decades” since then. In 
contrast, in other East Asian societies that experienced a much stronger com-
pression of modernity took a course of liberal familialism that makes use of the 
global market in the name of the family. Thus, different degrees of compres-
sion created the varieties of familialism we see in East Asia. 
We may say that both types of familialism have failed in constructing a sus-
tainable social system. The genuine familialism in Japan suppressed the flexi-
bility and adaptability of the family in the changing world, while the liberal 
familialism in other East Asian societies resulted in the harsh exclusion of 
economically disadvantaged people. In the near future, when other societies are 
as aged as Japan is today, the social reproduction of East Asia will become an 
even harder challenge without radical and dynamic policy changes. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Total Fertility Rates in East Asia and Other Selected Societies 
Area TFR Year 
Hong Kong 0.98 (2007) 
Taiwan 1.12 (2006) 
S. Korea 1.13 (2007) 
Singapore 1.25 (2007) 
Japan 1.32 (2007) 
China 1.7 (2007) 
Thailand 1.9 (2007) 
N. Korea 2.0 (2007) 
Myanmar 2.2 (2007) 
Vietnam 2.2 (2007) 
Indonesia 2.3 (2007) 
Mongol 2.3 (2007) 
Brunei 2.4 (2007) 
Malaysia 2.8 (2007) 
The Philippines 3.0 (2007) 
Cambodia 3.9 (2007) 
Laos 4.6 (2007) 
                           Source: Cabinet Office (2007). 
 
Table 2: Proportions Ever Experienced Cohabitation 
 Japan 2009 Korea 2009 Singapore 2009 
Age male female male female male female 
20-29 19.4% 19.5% 10.1% 2.0% 12.7% 9.3% 
30-39 33.0% 25.8% 11.1% 1.8% 12.6% 9.2% 
40-49 20.8% 12.5%  3.4% 0.6%  8.9% 7.0% 
 USA 2005 France 2005 Sweden 2005 
Age male female male female male female 
20-29 48.1% 51.2% 39.1% 53.0% 54.8% 69.0% 
30-39 62.0% 61.7% 61.0% 66.1% 80.8% 87.2% 
40-49 66.1% 60.5% 51.4% 45.9% 80.8% 77.5% 
Source: Kojima (2010) Table 2 based on Cabinet Office (2009) and (2005).  
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Table 3: Crude Marriage Rate, Crude Divorce Rate, The Ratio of Divorce and 
Marriage in Selected Societies 
Area Year CMR CDR div/mar 
Urugay (2007) 3.84 4.33 1.13 
Belgium (2007) 4.29 2.83 0.66 
Spain (2007) 4.49 2.80 0.62 
Hungary (2007) 4.06 2.50 0.62 
Cuba (2007) 5.05 3.08 0.61 
Austria (2007) 4.33 2.47 0.57 
Czech (2007) 5.53 3.01 0.54 
Russia (2007) 8.90 4.83 0.54 
France (2007) 4.33 2.22 0.51 
Germany (2007) 4.48 2.27 0.51 
Switzerland (2007) 5.34 2.63 0.49 
USA (2005) 7.50 3.60 0.48 
UK (2007) 5.14 2.37 0.46 
Taiwan (2007) 5.80 2.60 0.45 
The Netherlands (2007) 4.42 1.95 0.44 
Sweden (2007) 5.24 2.26 0.43 
Hong Kong (2007) - - *0.39 
S.Korea (2007) 7.10 2.57 0.36 
Japan (2007) 5.70 2.02 0.35 
Macao (2007) 3.90 1.30 0.33 
Singapore (2007) 5.22 1.48 0.28 
Poland (2007) 6.50 1.75 0.27 
China (2007) 7.50 1.58 0.21 
Italy (2007) 4.21 0.84 0.20 
Iran (2007) 11.80 1.40 0.12 
Mongol (2007) 15.70 0.67 0.04 
Vietnam (2007) 5.70 0.20 0.04 
East Asian societies  
*Calculated from numbers of marriage and divorce.  
Source: Hong Kong, Macao, Vietnam; United Nations Statistics Division (2008), Taiwan: Ito 
(2010), Other: NIPSSR (2010). 
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Table 4: Family Values in Asian Societies 
The total proportions of people who answered “Strongly agree,” “Fairly agree” 
and “Somewhat agree” 
 Japan Korea China Taiwan 
One must put familial well-being and interest 
before one’s own. 
50 79 68 83 
Divorce is usually the best solution when a 
couple can’t seem to work out their marriage. 
29 38 49 46 
People who want to divorce must wait until 
children are grown up. 
36 55 43 33 
To what extent do you think your own 
parent(s) influenced your decision of the 
current marriage partner? 
30 47 41 36 
Children must make efforts to do something 
that would bring honor to their parents. 
40 74 89 86 
It is not necessary to have children in mar-
riage. 
20 11 28 35 
It is all right for a couple to live together 
without intending to get married. 
28 22 25 36 
Source: Iwai and Yasuda (2009) based on EASS 2006. 
Figure 1: Trends in TFR in Five East Asian Societies 
 
   Source: Cabinet Office (2010). 
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Figure 2: Long-term Trends in TFR in Europe and Asia 
 
   Source: UN, Demographic Yearbook. 
 
Figure 3: Trends in Crude Divorce Rates in Five East Asian Societies 
 
     Source: Japan: NIPSSR (2010), Korea: Chang (2010a) and Statistics Korea (2008),   
     Taiwan: Ito (2010), Hong Kong: Census & Statistics Department (2002) (2007a)  
     (2007c), Singapore: Singapore Government, Department of Statistics (2009). 
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Figure 4: Trends in Age at First Marriage in Five East Asian Societies 
 
        Source: Japan: NIPSSR (2010), Korea: Chang (2010a), Taiwan: Suzuki (2010), 
Sun (2009), Taiwan Ministry of Interior (2010), Hong Kong: Census & Statistics 
Department (2001) (2007a) (2007b), Singapore: Singapore Government, Depart-
ment of Statistics (2009). 
 
Figure 5: Trends in Proportion Never Married in Japan 
 
        Source: NIPSSR (2010). 
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Figure 6: Changes in Women’s Labour Force Participation by Age in Japan 
 
        Source: NIPSSR (2010). 
 
Figure 7: Trends is Proportion over 65 in Selected Countries 
 
        Source: NIPSSR (2010). 
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